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ABSTRACT
This paper has been designed to present the changes in the population of very 
old persons, or the oldest-olds (defined here as individuals aged 80 or over) in 
Poland and the current member countries o f the European Union. In 2050 this share 
will be over 10% in all the EU countries in 2050 and in Austria and Italy -  it will 
exceed the level of 14%. Progress of the second phase of population aging will be 
still spatially differentiated. Discrepancy will also keep up between the sexes -  in 
the year 2050 the share of the oldest-olds will be higher by 3.5-5 percentage points 
in female than male populations. Another 25-years-lasting trend will continue -  
increase in the percentage of persons over 85 years of age among the old-olds. 
Growing chance to survive to the very old age combined with the relatively low 
level o f total fertility of the survivors will result in diminished ratios of potential 
old-age support. For instance, the number o f women aged 45-64 (most common 
caretakers) falling to persons aged 85 and over will drop about threefold from the 
present average o f 3.5 to 1.2.
Over the oncoming half-century, Poland - as compared with the EU countries 
-  will be characterized by a very low percentage o f the oldest-olds, high level of 
feminization of this population, a relatively low level o f its geriatrization and high 
potential old-age support ratios.
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Introduction
When the European Convention assembled again after the holiday break, its 
Chairman, Valery Giscard d’Estaign was pleased to state that the representatives of 
the EU countries did not intend to raise again the problem of a single social policy 
of the Union. The issue is extremely emotive due to both, uneven levels of 
economic development, institutional equipment determining the principles o f public 
means distribution and the demographic development.
The present paper will focus on the present and the future differences in the 
advance of population ageing, in its probably most important from the viewpoint of 
social policy aspect -  percentage o f the very old people, i.e. those aged 80 or over. 
This age threshold, as adopted in the present paper, follows the ‘new’ tradition in 
demographic research, although the author is fully aware o f the possibility to 
choose another criterion for discrimination o f the oldest-old age1. Tradition dating 
back at least to the early 1970s set the boundary between the ‘young-olds’ and the 
‘old-olds’ at 75 years o f age. Currently, geriatricians and gerontologists put forward 
well-justified premises which allow adopting the age o f 85 as the threshold of the 
oldest-old age [Baltes, Mayer, 1999], However, as it has already been mentioned, 
‘new’ demographic tradition (reflected among others in works o f the researchers of 
the most remarkable centre of studies on the advanced ageing at the Medical School 
of Odense University in Denmark, or the researchers cooperating with the Council 
of Europe) moves this threshold to the beginning of the ninth decade of life.
Aim of the present paper is to provide an image of the present size and the 
future evolution of the population in question, with a special focus on the 
differences between the situations in Poland and the current EU members. The 
oldest-olds -  unlike the broader category of older people -  are hardly ever subject to 
comparisons on the Europe-wide scale (see, e.g.: [Dlugosz, 2000]). Meanwhile, 
knowledge o f this population has -  beside the purely cognitive value -  also 
practical meaning. Advanced age is also associated with increase in the percentage
1 This notion refers to the concept o f  distinguishing the following phases in human life: 1) childhood and 
early youth, 2) working age, 3) young, ‘autonomous’, old age and 4) old old age, when a person needs 
permanent assistance from other persons.
of persons in need o f nursing care. German experience shows that for the 
subpopulation under 60, share of persons who qualify for institutionally-organized 
nursing care under the regulations o f social insurance is only 0.5%. The share grows 
to 5% in population aged 60-80, and it is as high as 20% among persons aged 80 or 
over. As a result, the oldest persons constitute as much as 43% o f all individuals 
eligible for such assistance, although they amount to less than 4% of total 
population [Błędowski, 2002:215], Therefore it can be presumed that the growth in 
the oldest-old population, even if their health status is increasingly improving 
(which is not self-evident), will stimulate demand for public (i.e. provided by the 
state sector) medical and nursing services which will be probably of serious 
financial and fiscal consequences. It is now that the specialists in social policy 
discussing policy on ageing and the elderly stress the necessity to work out and 
implement a subpolicy on very old persons [Szatur-Jaworska, 2000: 180-182],
Statistics on the EU countries and Poland presented in this work come from 
the data collected and published by the UN Population Division as World 
Population Prospects, version for year 2000 [UN, 2001], Due to the growing 
significance of the very old population, UN population projections published in the 
recent years provide fairly detailed information on the oldest-olds in the future. 
Habitual volume o f the papers published in the PPR makes it impossible to present 
all the quoted figures in a tabular form.
2. The oldest-olds in the past and at present
The second half o f the twentieth century was a period of a dynamic increase 
in the number and percentage o f the old-old persons in Europe, of a scope unheard- 
of over the whole history of mankind (see: [Szukalski, 2000a]). Two basic causes of 
such dynamic changes should be mentioned: 1) curbing mortality over the whole 
lifespan experienced by individuals who entered the old-old age in this period; 2) 
generations which reached the threshold of old-old age at that time were also bom 
in a period of high (compared to present) fertility on the continent. As a result, out 
of the big number o f children bom between 1870 and 1920 (exceeding the births in 
previous periods), bigger percentage (in spite of the two disastrous world wars), was
lucky enough to survive their eightieth and subsequent birthdays than in the 
preceding cohorts.
Most EU countries could observe three-, four-fold increase in number of old- 
olds between 1950 and 2000 (see Tab.l). The recorded increase was higher in the 
countries characterized by high mortality at the beginning o f the period under 
analysis and, as a consequence, low life expectancy.
Table 1. The old old (in thous) and its share in total population (%) in EU countries 



























































N 81 125 52 30 699 78 292 102 44 4 682 83 106 748 510 183
% 1.17 1.45 1.22 0.75 1.67 1.03 1.04 1.00 1.48 1.35 1.00 0.99 1.51 1.48 1.08 0.74
1960
N 122 169 74 41 914 111 353 158 55 5 1142 107 143 1000 662 217
% 1.73 1.85 1.62 0.93 2.00 1.33 1.16 1.38 1.94 1.59 1.56 1.21 1.91 1.91 1.32 0.73
1970
N 158 203 101 51 1172 179 528 225 56 6 1520 106 187 1238 986 302
% 2.12 2.10 2.05 1.11 2.31 2.04 1.56 1.72 1.90 1.77 1.94 1.22 2.33 2.23 1.83 0.92
1980
N 204 268 148 88 1662 226 630 324 63 8 2165 135 265 1553 1239 541
% 2.70 2.72 2.89 1.84 3.08 2.34 1.68 2.29 1.85 2.20 2.77 1.38 3.19 2.76 2.20 1.52
1990
N 276 349 190 141 2136 307 1161 432 74 11 2987 258 364 2092 1953 765
% 3.57 3.50 3.70 2.83 3.76 3.02 2.95 2.89 2.11 2.88 3.76 2.61 4.25 3.63 3.44 2.01
2000
N 286 375 214 175 2181 380 1505 511 99 14 2976 299 449 2411 2248 760
% 3.54 3.66 4.02 3.38 3.68 3.58 3.77 3.22 2.60 3.20 3.63 2.99 5.08 4.06 3.91 1.97
2010
N 399 554 228 238 3160 552 2113 633 120 20 4029 417 506 2860 3228 1192
% 5.02 5.38 4.24 4.59 5.16 5.22 5.34 3.88 2.86 4.08 4.95 4.14 5.81 4.75 5.72 3.12
2020
N 461 638 257 283 3565 698 2376 742 141 23 5474 486 534 3241 3832 1420
% 5.96 6.23 4.79 5.48 5.71 6.76 6.21 4.50 3.07 4.21 6.85 4.89 6.23 5.32 7.11 3.76
2030
N 578 745 377 416 4472 753 2692 1065 202 30 5908 561 758 4311 4317 1739
% 7.77 7.34 7.06 8.18 7.11 7.56 7.39 6.43 4.14 4.96 7.61 5.77 9.00 7.03 8.50 4.75
2040
N 617 958 426 490 5744 894 3320 1338 273 40 7314 686 842 5130 4880 2601
% 8.83 9.68 8.14 10.02 9.16 9.60 9.72 8.21 5.31 6.06 9.82 7.28 10.41 8.49 10.34 7.44
2050
N 938 1108 492 497 6443 1060 4181 1609 319 50 9332 824 948 6342 6039 2481
% 14.54 11.56 9.69 10.59 10.42 11.80 13.37 10.15 5.94 6.99 13.18 9.15 12.19 10.76 14.06 7.43
Therefore, it should be underlined that the population of old-old women 
grew faster than the population of very old men. As a result, the once relatively
narrow (in the case o f Italy, Ireland and Holland) gap between female and male 
populations o f very old persons widened significantly, and the rate o f feminization 
of this universe went up (see Table 2).
In the second half of the twentieth century growth in the oldest-old 
population was much swifter than increase in total population o f the present EU 
member countries. As a consequence, share of the oldest-olds in total population 
grew (see Table 1). In 1950, it oscillated around 1 percentage point, adopting 
significantly higher values only in Ireland, Belgium, France and Sweden. At 
present, the fraction o f the oldest-olds amounts to 3-4% of total population, with 
two countries standing distinctly apart -  Ireland, where very old people constitute 
only 2.6% of population and Sweden, where the discussed rate is 5.1%. 
Simultaneously, the difference between the percentages o f very old people in male 
and female populations keeps up which is an effect of different sizes of the two 
subpopulations. The currently observed differences resemble those recorded in 1950 
in the countries with the highest mortality levels. This means that the share o f the 
oldest females is two-, three- times higher than that of the oldest males. Only 
Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain have slightly more advantageous situation in 
this field. It is partly an effect of the fact that it was only in the recent three-four 
decades that major progress was made in these countries in curbing mortality and 
partly due to a small, as compared to other European countries, difference between 
male and female mortalities.
Now attention should be focused on the different levels of advance of the 
double ageing process1. Differences occurring in the past as well as those observed 
nowadays should be attributed to the long-range trends in mortality and 
reproduction. Only in the case of Germany, Ireland and Luxembourg -  it is 
migration that has been of a certain importance. Countries, whose population 
experienced decrease in mortality long time ago (France, Great Britain, Sweden and 
Holland), or whose populations were the first to use birth control, (France, 
Belgium) were characterized by a high share of the very old persons as early as the
1 Literature on the subject uses the notion o f  a double population ageing: the first phase o f  the process is 
characterized by an increase in the old population (60+, or 65+ years o f  age), share o f  very old individuals 
among the elderly changes the structure o f  this population.
beginning of the 1950s. However with time, the structure became uniform which 
was mainly related to the fact that the very countries which enjoyed the highest 
fertility in the first decades of the 20th century experienced the lowest reproduction 
rate in the last decades of the same century.
Also historical events affected the size, percentage and structure of the 
oldest-old population. Principally -  two world wars, which resulted in, firstly -  
diminished pace o f the very old population growth. It was a postponed effect of a 
decrease in births during World War I. Secondly, population losses related to 
military operations were of big importance, certainly stimulating increase in the 
feminization rates among the oldest population.
Poland, where the number of the oldest-old population grew by 315% 
between the years 1950 and 2000, is characterized by one o f the highest indicators 
(after Finland and Holland) informing of the growth rate o f the oldest-old 
population (detailed data for Poland can be found in [Szukalski, 2000b, 2001]). 
Nevertheless, owing to the high increase in population over the post-war period, the 
percentage o f the very old persons is still the lowest among the set o f countries 
under discussion. The gap between Poland and the EU countries has widened -  
both, in the absolute numbers and the relative terms. The process was most 
intensive in the fifty-year period under analysis. In the year 1950, a similar level of 
structure indicator was observed in Finland while in the other countries the share 
was higher by at least one-third, reaching the double value in extreme cases. 
Nowadays, fractions of the oldest-olds have grown by V\ in most of the EU 
countries, two-and -a-half times at maximum. Hence, having the European Union 
as a benchmark, Poland is a country o f a relatively less advanced population ageing; 
the statement also refers to the second phase o f the process, which is an effect of a 
disadvantageous evolution in mortality in the years 1960-1992 and the relatively 
high fertility as well.
The oldest-olds in the future
The UN-prepared and published population projection (in its most probable
version) allows following the changes and the percentage o f the very old persons 
over the oncoming half-century. Analysis o f these data should also take into 
account the possible errors coming from two sources: false assumptions on the 
future mortality and fertility. It is decidedly easier to project changes in mortality; 
hence the number o f the very old persons can be presumed as fairly reliable (all the 
persons who will have reached the threshold of 80 years o f age or will have lived 
through it by the year 2050 are living at present). However, the changes in the share 
of the very old persons are not as much dependable, because the future trends in 
procreation cannot be foreseen (birth number, difficult to project, has an effect on 
the proportions).
Dynamic increase in the size of very old population can be expected in all 
the EU countries. The number of very old persons will double in almost all the EU 
countries (Table 1). In 2050, the number of very old population will exceed 6m in 
Italy, France and Great Britain and 9m in Germany. These figures are big enough to 
raise doubts on the possibility to adequately secure the needs of the oldest 
population. The necessity to consider the problem becomes even more explicit in 
the light of the forecasted percentages of the very old persons (Table 1). Instead of 
the present 3%-4%, shares of 6% -15% can be presumed, with a dominant situation 
of the very old constituting 10-12% of total population.
To a greater extent, the scope of the projected evolution will be determined 
by the size of individual generations - world wars caused the negligible population 
increase at the turn of the 20th century as well as the third decade of the century, 
while the post-war baby boom encouraged the expected swift increase in the 
number of very old population in the 2030s.
The oncoming half-century is to be a period of a faster increase in the 
numbers o f old males than females (Table 2). As a result, the indicators of 
feminization should be slightly improved. However, the change will be not big 
enough to influence the fact that the second phase of ageing process will be much 
more advanced in female than male populations, as the rate will be only 7-8% 
among men and as high as 13%-14% among women. The records in this field will 
be reported in the countries of a long-standing very low fertility -  Austria, Italy,
Spain and Germany.
Table 2. Feminization rates of the old-old population in the EU countries and in 
Poland, 1950-2050 (females per 1,000 males)
Country
Year
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Austria 1531 1772 2180 2440 2493 2530 2209 1839 1693 1619 1560
Belgium 1500 1600 1756 2152 2355 2318 2038 1895 1699 1621 1596
Denmark 1260 1176 1428 1846 2064 2014 1948 1782 1643 1679 1631
Finland 2000 2153 2400 2520 2615 2733 2338 2021 1773 1816 1823
France 1936 2056 2457 2405 2223 2207 2075 1986 1790 1810 1804
Greece 1437 1312 1594 1483 1425 1467 1525 1591 1596 1591 1592
Spain 2173 1801 1854 1889 1931 1986 1889 1895 1814 1763 1723
Holland 1217 1194 1343 1817 2248 2275 2102 1879 1691 1698 1644
Ireland 1200 1291 1275 1625 1777 1511 1951 1857 1753 1775 1823
Luxembourg 1000 1500 2000 2500 2666 2500 2800 2000 1727 1785 1823
Germany 1409 1455 1889 2389 2572 2875 2388 1884 1782 1641 1565
Portugal 2074 2057 2212 2000 1965 1960 2159 2344 2280 2156 2007
Sweden 1304 1269 1460 1760 1866 1848 1837 1733 1583 1603 1564
Great Britain 1770 1979 2419 2654 2289 2155 1904 1766 1671 1662 1597
Italy 1318 1281 1643 2014 1986 2062 2004 1947 1853 1796 1727
Poland 1815 1880 2020 2360 2269 2318 2408 2517 2399 2216 2149
Compared with the present EU member countries, Poland will be still 
characterized by a low share of the oldest persons over the forthcoming five 
decades. However, the indicators in two other countries (Ireland, Luxembourg) will 
be even lower at the end of the analyzed period. Like in the case o f other countries, 
dynamic increases in the number and percentage of the oldest population are 
expected after the year 2030, as a result o f ageing o f the post-war baby boom 
generation. In the case o f our country, a decline in feminization rate is also forecast; 
however it will come after a period of an increased value of the indicator and its 
level will be much higher in 2050 than it is now. Nevertheless, even this 7.5% share 
of the oldest old -  although very low, against the benchmark o f other countries -  
will necessitate employing different social and health policies.
Potential caretakers for the oldest persons
Within the very old population, a process can be observed o f a growing share 
o f individuals defined as the oldest old by the strictest criterion -  the ones aged 85 
or over. These persons constitute, as a rule, 45%-50% of the total very old 
population. In the year 2050, the share will oscillate (also in Poland) around 55% 
(up to 62% in female inhabitants of France, Belgium and Finland). In all, persons 
aged 85 and over will constitute, as a rule, 5% -7% o f population. Therefore, it can 
be suspected that -  in spite of the improved health status and physical fitness of the 
population in question -  the number of persons in need of permanent care provided 
by formal and informal caretakers will grow.
Attempts to define the ability to satisfy for the caring and nursing needs of 
the very old persons by the members of their families found in the literature on the 
subject refer to ratios of the existent dependency and the potential support1. At the 
present stage the author would also like to refer to a measure defining the 
correlation between the number of typical carers o f the oldest old and the size of 
this population. However, this does not mean that an assumption is made here that 
the old age as such creates a necessity to receive assistance. Thus, many oldest-olds 
are autonomous persons. However, it can be presumed that passing the threshold of 
the oldest age strongly increases the need to seek assistance from the next of kin 
and closest friends. Seeing the inability to unequivocally define the future 
percentage o f persons in need of such help, it is convenient to compare the number 
of the potential principal caretakers to the number of all persons potentially in need 
of support.
Data from surveys conducted within our cultural environment show that the 
typical carers of the oldest old are their sons/daughters [Szukalski, 2002]. 
Therefore, our ratio of old-age support is defined as correlation between the 
numbers o f females aged 45-64 to the number of the oldest old. Further discussion
1 The only difference between the indicators lies in the way they are calculated -  in the case when the 
potential carers are in the denominator and individuals in need o f  support -  in the numerator, the obtained 
result is referred to as a dependency ratio. When the counted ratio is reversed, the obtained result is the 
potential old age support ratio. Dominating trend o f political correctness which employs an optimistic, 
official version o f  the future encourages international organizations to use the notion o f  potential old-age 
support ratio rather than the ratio o f potential old age dependency in their documents.
will concentrate on the mentioned ratio in the EU countries and in Poland over the 
oncoming half-century, as viewed by the UN population projection (see Table 3).
Table 3. Potential old-age support ratios (ratio of females aged 45-64 to persons 
aged 80 and over) for Poland and EU countries 2000-2050
Country Year
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Austria 3.41 2.84 2.69 1.84 1.48 0.88
Belgium 3.28 2.62 2.3 1.78 1.31 1.07
Denmark 3.22 3.29 2.97 1.82 1.48 1.32
Finland 3.97 3.24 2.43 1.54 1.3 1.18
France 3.2 2.66 2.36 1.77 1.29 1.12
Greece 3.44 2.6 2.24 2.06 1.46 1.01
Spain 3.03 2.55 2.59 2.24 1.44 0.89
Netherlands 3.79 3.71 3.3 2.04 1.5 1.26
Irland 4.01 4.13 3.88 3.13 2.33 1.83
Luxemburg 3.79 3.2 3.13 2.37 1.9 1.72
Germany 3.62 2.88 2.23 1.77 1.3 0.95
Portugal 4.1 3.24 3.07 2.67 1.84 1.33
Sweden 2.49 2.35 2.21 1.44 1.29 1.04
United Kingdom 2.93 2.89 2.67 1.82 1.47 1.16
Italy 3.3 2.51 2.7 1.81 1.19 0.88
Poland 5.12 4.64 3.64 3.15 2.11 1.69
Over the upcoming half-century, a continuous decrease in the potential 
oldest-old-age support ratio is expected. It will be particularly dynamic in the 2030s 
and 2040s due to the simultaneous swift increase in the oldest population and 
entering the age of a typical carer by the female cohorts o f the 1970s, 1980s and the 
1990, which was a period o f baby bust in Europe. As a result, instead o f the present 
3-4 potential carers, in 2050 only a little more than one supporting person will fall 
to a very old individual. The ratio will adopt lower values in Italy, Austria, Spain 
and Germany, while in Sweden, Belgium and Greece it will slightly exceed one. 
This means that over the forthcoming decades, the burden on the oldest-olds’ family 
members should be expected to grow, accompanied by the increased caregiving 
burden, i.e. the feeling of psychical and economic overloading with the necessity to
provide care to the related oldest-olds, and as a consequence -  probably the 
increased demands addressed to public institutions.
It should be clearly stressed that the presented evolution o f the indicator does 
not automatically mean that the volume of the family support will be reduced to 
about one-third of the present value -  it should be remembered that the oldest-olds 
enjoy increasingly better health and that the decisive majority o f the oldest persons’ 
families fulfill their caretaking duties and they plan to do so in the future.
Against the benchmark of the EU countries, the evolution of the ratio of 
potential old-age support in Poland is advantageous, as we will belong, beside 
Ireland and Luxembourg, to the countries characterized by the highest ratios. This is 
primarily an effect of a relatively high fertility in the 1970s and the 1980s and hence 
having a big number of women of caretaking age as well as a relatively low degree 
of advance o f the second phase of ageing. However, the fact deserves attention that 
in the years 2000-2050 the discussed indicator is expected to drop as low as one- 
third o f its initial value, which unequivocally indicates the scale o f the future 
increase in burden on the potential carers.
Conclusions
Data presented in the paper unequivocally indicate the future increase in 
number and share of the oldest-olds. Scale of this growth depends on individual 
attributes of demographic processes -  mainly in the scopes of childbearing and 
mortality, but also union formation and migration -  within the areas of individual 
countries with differentiated provision of institutionalized care. Differences in 
demographic history and processes result in continued differentiation in advance of 
the second phase of population ageing in the territories o f the present EU member 
countries. This differentiation -  measured by the correlation between the maximum 
and the minimum shares of the very old population will be higher in 2050 than it 
was in 1950 or 2000, and the advance of the second stage of population ageing in 
the countries of Southern Europe in the 21st century will be of a size which will 
have an effect on almost every sphere of public private lives.
Between the years 1950 and 2050, the number of the very old persons in the 
EU countries is projected to grow over tenfold, and the share o f this population will 
grow in a similar way. Compared to the present situation, in fifty years’ time, the 
number of the very old will have tripled and their share in the total will be three- 
and-a-half times higher. This indicates the scale o f problems facing the future 
policy makers and those responsible for implementing the policy on the broadly- 
understood public health and social policy. The task is even more difficult as the 
forecasted increase in population o f the extremely olds (90-, 100-year-olds), i.e. the 
persons whose health status and fitness are difficult to predict, compels policy 
makers to seek solutions in a ‘terra incognita’, taking into account the hitherto 
scarce occurrence of individuals at that age (e.g. the problems connected with the 
necessity to provide health services at patients’ homes, common occurrence of 
Alzheimer’s Disease, which affects one in four, five persons over 85 years o f age1).
Poland will also experience an evolution in size and percentage o f the very 
old population similar to that in the EU countries. Hitherto political and economic 
conditions as well as the long-lasting influence of demographic factor on population 
processes will cause that in comparison to the countries -  current EU members as 
well as those which are to join the EU in 2004 -  share of the very old persons in 
Poland’s total population will be relatively low. However, this does not mean that 
such a low share allows neglecting construction o f the concrete legislative- 
organizational tasks aimed at providing for various needs expressed by the 
population in question.
Pertinence of a significant differentiation in advance o f the second phase of 
population ageing will be one of the key reasons why all the Euro-enthusiasts’ 
discussion on single European welfare, social or tax policies cannot be successful. 
Countries in a relatively better position -  assessed increasingly more often by the 
demographic criteria (e.g [Galop Ameryki ..., 2002]) -  which could do with lower 
financial outlays on indispensable social needs, will not be ready to contribute to the
1 Statistics in this field are alarming -  e.g. the US statistics show that that for the male population, the 
percentage o f  Alzheimer patients grows from 5.6% o f population at the age o f  80 to 35.6% at the age 95. In 
the female population the respective figures are 7.1% - 41.5%, respectively (see:. Dunkle R-, Roberts B., 
Haug M., The oldest old in everyday life. S e l f  perception, coping with change, and stress , Springer, New 
York 2001, p. 10).
common coffer more than they might receive from it.
It should be also taken into account that the figures presented in this paper 
are probably underestimated. Experience of the several recent years shows (e.g. 
comparison o f several subsequent UN projections), that assumptions on the future 
mortality as a rule underappreciate the progress in medicine and the assumptions on 
childbearing overrate the actual tendency to have children. In effect, in the future 
we will have to face a situation when -  compared to the discussed projection - more 
numerous throngs of the very old people will coexist with the less numerous groups 
of young people. Thus to some extent, it will add to the number o f very old people 
and -  to a still greater extent -  it will boost their share in total population. Therefore 
the current trends should be monitored on a permanent basis in the scope of health 
status and mortality of the old and old-old persons in order to prevent a situation 
when the symptoms indicating actual advance of the second phase o f population 
ageing come unnoticed. It should be expected that in the nearest thirty years, the 
threshold of advanced population ageing (of an unknown value) will be trespassed 
between the natural population ageing (being a result of evolution in mortality) and 
a pathological state (a result of a rapid change in age structure due to childbearing 
evolution), which will cause various consequences on unprecedented scale.
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